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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
JACK E. LAKE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

vs.
Case No.

ROBERT J. PINDER,
Defendant and
Appellant,

9382

STANDARD GILSONITE COMPANY,
a Utah corporation, and ROBERT M.
WILLIAMSON
I

Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the original complaint plaintiff, Jack E. Lake
sued Standard Gilsonite, Pinder and Williamson.
The latter were respectively President and Secretary of Standard Gilsonite but they were sued in an
individual capacity. Williamson was never served
and thus never became a party.

l~ I ~ In' the first complaint Lake alleged that Pinder
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and Williamson, as trustees for the corpora.tion,
agreed to deliver 37,500 shares of Standard Gilsonite
stock to plaintiff, and had violated their trust. He
claimed to be damaged thereby. On June 11, 1959,
plaintiff and Standard Gilsonite stipulated that Standard Gilsonite would deliver to Lake 6,500 shares of
stock whereupon Lake would dismiss the action as
to Standard Gilsonite Company. Accordingly, the
action was dismissed as to Standard Gilsonite on the
15th day of June, 1959.
On February 1, 1960, without a motion or any
notice to defendant Pinder, plaintiff amended his
complaint, stating that Pinder, on behalf of the corporation, agreed to sell Lake 37,500 shares of stock;
that Pinder then agreed to hold the same as trustee
for Lake; that subsequently Lake and Pinder entered
into a joint venture and that Lake agreed to let Pinder use Lake's stock to procure Pinder's contribution to the joint venture upon Pinder's agreement
to replace the stock so borrowed; and that pursuant
to this arrangement Pinder used 31000 shares of the
stock he allegedly was holding for Lake, but that he
failed to replace the same.
In his answer, defendant Pinder denied all material allegations of plaintiff's complaint.
At the trial the evidence was very conflicting.
Lake testified substantially in accordance with the
allegations of his complaint.
The so-called "trust" relationship between Pinder and Lake assertedly arose because on February
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11, 1958, Standard Gilsonite Co. had agreed to trade
37,500 shares of its stock to plaintiff for 7,500 shares
of stock owned by plaintiff in the L. H. & L. Mining
Co. (T-60). Subsequently, plaintiff met Pinder, the
president of Standard Gilsonite Co. (T-53) and on or
about March 15, 1958, plaintiff delivered his L.H.&L.
stock to Pinder in Denver, Colorado (T-66). In exchange, Pinder gave plaintiff a handwritten letter
as follows, which was introduced as Exhibit 2:
"I hand you forthwith a receipt for 7,500 shares
(Seven Thousand Five Hundred) L.H.&L . Mining
stock as trustee to be delivered to Standard Gilsonite upon payment of Thirty Seven Thousand Five
Hundred shares (37 ,500) of Standard stock. Said
stock to be escrowed on delivery as mutually agreed.
s/

R. J. Pinder
President Standard"

It was uncontraverted that the L.H.&L. stock V\ra_s
actually delivered to Standard Gilsonite Co. by Pinder and that on January 19, 1959, Standard GilsonHe Co. issued the 37,500 shares in the name of Jack
E. Lake in care of Standard Gilsonite Co (T-157).
Up to this point there is little dispute, exceot
that Pinder denied that he held any property in
trust for Lake except for the 7,500 shares of L.H.0:L.
stock which he took from Lake and deliverecl to
Standard Gilsonite Co. (T-283, 305). Lake, on the
other hand, claimed that Exhibit 2 constituted Pinder
trustee of the 37,500 shares of Standard Gilsonite
stock as well (T-185).
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From this point on the testimony was conflictIng on almost every detail.
Lake claimed to have owned the franchise for
the State of Texas to distribute products manufactured by the Life Massage Co. (T-54). He testified
that Pinder had expressed interest in the said company (T-54). The exact details of the alleged 'joint
venture" into the Life Massage business are difficult to work out from Lake's testimony. At page 57
of the Transcript he testified:
" . . . he said that would be no problem to him to
come up with that money, but he had to work it out
when he returned to Denver, and I told him I would
give fifteen percent interest in the company.''
000

"So I told him he could have fifty percent interest
in the company for putting up the necessary capital
and he could take all of his money back out of the
first earnings of the company ... and then he told
me no, that was too much. He said, 'I want you to
run the operation.' He said, 'I'm not going to be
active.' He said, 'I'll finance it. You will have to take
care of all of the work of running it,' and he said,
'Let me have my finances back and I'll finance it'."
"THE COURT: 'Is this Pinder talking?
A.

"Yes. He said he would be active and I won't be
active.
"THE COURT: I heard you.

A.

"I said, 'Perfectly agreeable to me.'
"MR. TUFT: I can't hear you, Mr. Lake.

A.

"I told him it was perfectly agreement with me if
that was satisfactory to 'him. That he would receive
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a third of the income of the company. That would
be net. I would give him one third after all of the
operating expenses and he would get all of his financing back first. I would receive the expenses and
living expenses until such time as he received his
capital back."

There is no further testimony in the record with
respect to the details of the alleged "joint venture"
except Mr. Pinder's denial that a joint venture or
partnership ever existed (T-284, 294, 306-307).
Evidence was also introduced which showed
that on March 20, 1958, Pinder gave a check to Lake
for $1,000. On the back of the check was the legend,
"Loan to be secured by Standard Gilsonite stock.
Payable 6 months." Below this legend were affixed
the signatures of Jack Lake and Stanley J. Lake. This
check was introduced as Exhibit 26.
On April 9, 1958, Pinder gave Lake another
check for $1,000. On the back of this check was the
word "Loan." Below appeared the signature of Jack
Lake. This check was introduced as Exhibit 25.
There was also evidence that in addition to
these two checks Pinder had advanced Lake $500
by telegraphic money order (T-177) and an additional $200 also in cash on another occasion. (T-292-93).
Lake explained these amounts first of all by admitting that they constituted loans to him personally
(T-170). After the noon recess, however, Lake testified that the $2,500 constituted an advance by Pinder
for the Life Massage venture (T-188, 189). Lake also
testified that he could not testify "Yes" or "No" as
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to whether the checks were marked "Loan" when
given to him. (T-171) (See also T-211 and 125).
Pinder stated that the checks and the other $500
were personal loans which he made to Lake personally until Pinder could get to Texas to complete
the sale of some of Lake's Standard Gilsonite stock
which was at that time subject to escrow agreement
with the company (T-285, 286), and further that the
legends were on the backs of the checks at the time
they were given to Lake (T-286). Pinder further testified that the loans toLake were repaid to Pinder out
of the proceeds of the first sale of Lake's stock. The
testimony of both parties indicated that 31,000 shares
of Lake's stock in Standard Gilsonite Company had
been sold in two transactions. The first such transaction occurred on April 11, 1958. On that date
through Pinder's efforts 16,000 shares of stock were
sold to McGee Enterprises of Hereford, Texas at 25c
per share. Lake testified that he signed an authorization for the company to transfer his shares (T-74).
The authorization was introduced as Exhibit 22 and
as follows:
STATE OF TEX.1\S
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE

PRESENTS~

"COUNTY OF DEAF SMITH
'The undersigned, Jack E. Lake, does hereby transfer and assign to Mcgee Enterprises, of Hereford,
Txas, 16,000 shares of stck in STandard Gilsonite
Co. and I do .hereby authorize R. J. Pender of any
other person named by Taft Mcgee to issue and deliver said stock of said corporation to the SaidMcG·ee En terpris.es. The undersi-gned does hereby acSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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knowledge the payment of $4,000.00 as the complete
consideration for said stock and from this date on
the ownership of said stock shall be in said purchaser regardless of the date of the issuance and deli very thereof.
"In Testimony whereof witness my hand on this
the 11th day of April, 1958.
s/

Jack E. Lake

"THE STATE OF TEXAS
"COUNTY OF DEAF' SMITH
"BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority on this
day dersonally appeared Jack E. Lake, known to me
to be the person whose name is subscribei to th~
foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that
he executed the same for the purposes and consideration therein expressed.
"GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF
OFFICE this the 12th day of April, 1958.
(Seal)
sf

James W. Witherspoon
Notary Public in and
for Deaf Smith County,
Texas"

Thereupon, Lake received a check for $4,000
(T-74). He then gave Pinder the check for $4,000 a.nd
Pinder gave Lake a check in return for $1,300 (T-76).
The $1,300 check was introduced as Exhibit 24.
Lake explained this transaction as follows:
That he met Pinder in Houston and asked him
about the money Pinder was to put into their joint
venture; that Pinder, to raise some money, proposed
to borrow some stock from Lake and sell the same
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to McGee and Witherspoon agreeing to replace the
borrowed stock with stock of his own; that thereupon Pinder took the proceeds of the sale and gave
Lake $1,300 to cover Lake's expenses (T-73-76).
Pinder explained the transaction as follows, denying that any joint venture existed:
That as soon as Lake delivered his 7,500 shares
of L.H.&L. stock he began to talk of the possibility
of selling his Standard Gilsonite stock because the
Life Massage business was more important to Lake;
that Pinder told him that the Standard Gilsonite stock
was in escrow because it was investment stock and
was very difficult to sell; that Lake asked if Pinder
knew of anyone who would buy it on a long range
investment basis; that some people in Texas agreed
to buy 15,000 or 16,000 shares; that Pinder could not
get to Texas immediately to complete the transaction; that Lake would call Pinder 3 or 4 times a day
about the stock; that Lake's financial condition was
critical, and on one occasion he told Pinder that
his car had been repossessed; that Pinder loaned
Lake $2,500 because he knew he could obtain repayment as soon as the sale was completed; that
to protect himself he put the legends on the backs
of the checks sent to Lake; that as soon as the transaction was completed and the stock sold, Pinder
took the $4,000 check from Lake and gave Lake his
own check for $1,300 plus $200 cash, thus regaining the $2500 which he had previously loaned Lake
(T-285-287, 289, 291-299).
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Pinder also denied that he had ever agreed
to replace Lake's stock, and further testified tha.t
Lake had never asked him to replace any stock (T295-296).
The parties also testified that on April 17, 1958,
another transaction occurred in which 15,000 shares
of Lake's Standard Gilsonite stock were sold for 30c
per share. Lake testified that Pinder told him he'd
have to sign another stock power. He further testified that he didn't understand the transaction until
Lake's brother who was present explained it to him
and said it was "a fair deal." Lake thereupon wrote
and signed in his own handwriting, the authorization (T-81), which was introduced as Exhibit 21, and
which stated as follows:
"April 17, 1958
Houston, Texas
"First National Bank
of Hereford, Texas
"Dear Sir,
"There is a check drawn on Mr. McGee and Mr.
Whitherspoon account by a Mr. Pinder, in the
amount of $5,000.00 which is in for collection now,
it is in payment of 15,000 shares of Standard Gilsonite stock, this letter is to serve as a stock power
for said 15,000 shares of stock. I am sending this
letter as stock power at the request of Mr. Pinder.
"Signature guaranteed
"By R. J. Pinder
Pres. Std. Gils·onite
Sincerely,
s/ Jack E. Lake
Room 29
Buffalo in Hotel
9051 South Main St.
Houston Texas"
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This stock power then forwarded with a sight
draft ~ade payable to Jack E. Lake, which was honored (T-199). The proceeds were deposited by Lake
in a bank account on which the only signatory was
Lake (T-178). Both partie_s agreed that Pinder received none of the proceeds of the second sale (T82/1 197-98).
Lake, however, claimed these proceeds were
to be part of Pinder's contribution to the "joint venture" and that Pinder agreed to replace this stock
with his own shares. Pinder again denied that a
joint venture ever existed or was contemplated, and
denied that he ever agreed to act as trustee of Lake's
stock or to replace any of Lake's stock with his own
(T-305).
With respect to the alleged joint venture, Lake
testified that the business had not been successful
because Pinder, who was supposed to contribute
$12,000 to $13,000 only contributed the $9,000 derived from the stock sales heretofore mentioned.
On cross examination Lake aclmitted that his
was the only signature on the bank account opened
in the company name in Houston, Texas IT-178), that
he had never formed a corporation (T-179), that he
had never taken a lease on any premises in Texas
(T-179), that he used the money for his personal
needs, except that $2,600 had gone for 9quipment
which was subsequently liquidated {T-179), in order
for Lake to live (T-181), that he had never taken out
a business license in Texas (T-199), and that he had
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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never filed any action for the damage he allegedly
suffered in the Life Massage joint venture (T-201).
At the conclusion of the trial, the Judge, who
sat without a jury, observed that there was a conflict in the testimony, and announced his decision
as follows:
"THE COURT: I will tell you gentlemen there are
a few things here, as you both agree, there is a conflict between the witnesses as to what this was, but
there are a few things that I think I can attach to
as being some indication to the clue of this matter.
There is one matter, Mr. Pinder's story that he is repaying these loans out if this $4,000.00, that all fits
very well, but with the one exception I think these
che·cks show that the writing on that one where the
loan is secured by the stock is over the bank stamp.
I think that i s "MR. TUFT: Could we have that examined your
honor?
"THE COURT: Well, just let me finish. I think that
is quite clear, that it appears to me that writing is
on top, which refutes the idea that there was a loan;
that that check was given for that.
"Well now, we have an old rule of law and evidence
that if a witness falsifies about one thing you can
disbelieve his testimony on others. While Mr. Pinder's story of this loan - and it fits into the $4,000.00 - would be quite convincing if it were not
for the fact that I think that that is not borne out
and the contrary is borne out by the writing on that
check.
"MR. TUFT:
Honor?

Could we have it examined, Your

"THE COURT: You can have it examined, but I
am not going to continue the trial for that.
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·'MR. McCULLOUGH: Can I point out one thing,
if that contention be true, the endorsements are certainly not in the customary place.
"THE COURT: Yes, that is right. But that is
quite clear that that is above the stamp. You can see
the print underneath it.
"Now I think the best evidence here of what the
value of this stock is what they sold it for and while
there may be other sporadic sales for a dollar and
later on some more I think the value that they
agreed on at the time they sold this, whatever their
arrangement was, is the best evidence of its value.
That Mr. Pinder was to act as trustee of course the
receipt shows that; so there must have been some
trust. This $5,000.00 that was received went into a
bank account for this Life Massage, if I understand
the evidence, and there are checks and a bank account to show that. The 31,000 shares that are in dispute and the 30c a share would be $9,300.00 is the
amount that I believe the plaintiff is entitled to
and, for the reasons that I have stated, that will be
the judgment, in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant for the sum of $9,300.00 and court
costs."

Thereafter plaintiff presented Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and a judgment which were
signed by the trial Judge on September 14, 1960. On
September 21st defendant filed a motion to amend
the Findings and Conclusions to conform to the
Findings which the court announced from the
bench. According to the terms of an affidavit of
defendant's attorney, he also sought to present to
the trial judge photostatic copies to demonstrate
the condition of the two checks with respect to the
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legends on the reverse side at the time they cleared
the bank, which was rejected by the trial court.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I

THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE
TRIAL.
II
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS IN SUFFICIENT TO
JUSTIFY THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT.
III

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED THE MAXIM IIFALSUS IN UNO/ FALSUS IN
OMNIBUS/' TO DISCREDIT DEFENDANT/S TESTIMONY.
ARGUMENT
I

THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE TRIAL.
Appellant respectfully submits that the Findings
of Fact signed by the trial court are contrary to the
evidence adduced at the trial in the following particulars:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a) The court erred in finding that defendant
agreed with the plaintiff to deliver the L.H.&L.
Mining Company "only upon the payment to
the plaintiff of 37,500 shares of the capital stock
of Standard Gilsonite Company." (T-16).
The foregoing statement advanced by plaintiffs
counsel and adopted by the trial court does not
even conform to the testimony of the plaintiff himsel£.
At page T-62 the plaintiff testified:
" . . . but the balance he (Pinder) would act as
trustee and he would not deliver my L.H.&L. stock
until he made sure they would issue the 37,500
shares . . . ,, (Emphasis added).

We submit there is a substantial difference in
these two versions, inasmuch as the 37,500 shares
were finally issued by Standard Gilsonite Company
and it was never proved at the trial that defendant
did deliver the L.H.&L. stock prior to such a time as
he "made sure they would issue the 37,500 shares."
b) That the trial court erred in finding as a fact
"that the defendant breached his trust agreement and delivered the plaintiff's L.H.&L. stock
to Standard Gilsonite Company immediately upon his return to Salt Lake City from Denver, Colorado." (T-16).
In the first place the statement "that the defendSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ant breached his trust agreement" is properly a conclusion of law and not a finding of fact. In the second place, as noted above under subdivision a),
even plaintiff's own testimony did not prove any
breach of agreement on the part of defendant in
delivering the L. H. & L. stock to Standard Gilsonite
Company immediately upon his return to Salt Lake
City, since the evidence did not show that at that
time there was anything which would lead defendant to believe that Standard Gilsonite would not issue the 37,500 shares agreed upon to plaintiff. It
is true that there was considerable delay on the
part of the company in issuing the stock. The company secretary, whose duty it was to complete the
transfer testified that the company experienced difficulty in accomplishing the transfer of the L.H.&L.
stock (T-268). However, the record clearly shows that
as soon as all requirements for the transfer were
completed (see Exhibit 19, and also T-268-272)/ 37~500 shares of stock were finally issued to plaintiff
on January 19, 1959 (T-157).
c) That the court erred in finding that '/the defendant, Robert J. Pinder, agreed with the plaintiff that he would advance to the venture $15,000 to provide capital for the organizational expenses, including the living expenses and expenses already incurred by the plaintiff, Jack
E. Lake, while in training with the Life Massage
and Home Equipment Company in Denver/ Colorado. " (T-17).
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According to the testimony of Lake, Pinder was
to advance $12,000 to $13,000 (T-67, 127, 200; 201;
222). Furthermore, the record is totally devoid of
any evidence which would indicate that the expenses already incurred by Lake in Denver were to be
borne by Pinder, or were to come out of any funds
advanced by Pinder.
d) That the court erred in finding that "Pursuant to this agreement the defendant advanced
the sum of $2,000.00." (T-17).
It is an elementary rule of law that a witness's testimony is no stronger than upon cross-examination. On cross-examination the plaintiff admitted that the $2,000.00 advanced by Pinder were personal loans to the plaintiff (T-169, 170).
e)
That the court erred in finding that "the
defendant did not intend to deliver the stock to
the plaintiff as agreed, but intended to defraud
him of his stock." (T-19)
Any possible fraud on the part of the defendant
was neither pleaded nor proved in this action. The
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require that the acts
constituting any alleged fraud be set forth with specificity in the complaint. The only allegations of plaintiff's amended complaint with respect to the 31,000
shares of stock which defendant allegedly agreed
to replace were "but that the defendant, Robert J.
Pinder, has failed and refused to deliver the 31,000
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shares of stock to which the plaintiff is
9, 10)

entitled.~~

(T-

At the trial the defendant denied that he had
ever agreed to replace any stock for Lake, and contended that the sales were for Lake's benefit and
Lake received the proceeds thereof, less the
amounts which Pinder had previously loaned to
Lake.
It is respectfully submitted that the allegations
of the amended complaint do not raise any issue
of fraud, and that there is no evidence in the record
to justify the court's finding in this respect.
f)
That the court erred in finding that ''the
defendant did not cause the 37,500 shares of
stock due the plaintiff to even be issued until
May of 1959. That he thereafter caused the stock
to be transferred to persons other than the plaintiff. (T-20).
II

The uncontroverted evidence shows that the
stock was issued January 19, 1959 (T-157). Further
evidence, which is also uncontroverted, shows that
the defendant was not the active offi~er in arranged
for the transfer of the stock of Standard Gilsonite
Company, but that such was the duty of the company secretary, Robert M. Williamson, who actually
performed the duty and received the shares from
the transfer agent (T-268, 269).
Stipulations of plaintiff's counsel at the trial,
and the testimony of Gale Holt, comptroller of StandSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ard Gilsonite Company, who was produced as a
witness on behalf of the plaintifL indicate that 6500
shares of stock were delivered to plaintifL and were
traded by him on the open market (T-165, 166). The
remaining 31,000 shares were covered by the two
stock transfers previously executed by plaintiff personally. On March 4, 1960, a 15,000 share certificate
issued in the name of Jack E. Lake was transferred
to Taft McGee (T-162). On AprilS, 1959, a 16,000
share certificate issued to Jack E. Lake was transferred to a Harold Dunn (T-158). The evidence indicated
that a stock power covering these shares had been
executed by plaintiff in favor of McGee Enterprises
(See Exhibit 21).
While Mr. Dunn's connection with McGee Enterprises is not shown by the testimony, it is respectfully submitted that when the plaintiff executed the
stock power he knowingly gave up his right to have
those 16,000 shares issued and delivered to him by
the company.
II

THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO
JUSTIFY THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT.
The defendant respectfully contends that conclusion No. 2 "That the defendant is liable -to the
plaintiff for the reasonable value of the 31,000 shares
of stock which has never been delivered to the plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tiff . . . is not supported by the Findings o£ Fact
or the evidence.
II

This case was tried on the theory that defendant,
while acting as a trustee for plaintiff of 37,500 shares
of Standard Gilsonite stock, converted 31,000 shares
from plaintiff. (See T-8-10, 28, 92 160-161.) We submit
that the Findings of Fact and plaintiff's testimony itself do not support the proposition that defendant
was ever a trustee of plaintiff's Standard Gilsonite
stock or the proposition that defendant converted
any of the said stock. For convenience and clarity
the foregoing matters will be treated separately.
a) As to whether defendant was a trustee for
plaintiff of Standard Gilsonite stock.
Plaintiff's testimony with respect to the alleged
trust of Standard Gilsonite stock, except for one variance, is well summarized in Finding of Fact Nos. 2
and 3, the important details of which are as follows:
a) On February 11, 1958, the Board of Directors of Standard Gilsonite Company approved
the sale of 37,500 shares of stock to plaintiff in
exchange for 7,500 shares of stock in L. H. & L.
Mining Co. owned by plaintiff.
b) On March 15, 1958, plaintiff delivered his
stock in the L. H. & L. Mining Co. to defendant
in Denver, and the defendant agreed with the
plaintiff to take the said stock as trustee and to
deliver the same to Standard Gilsonite ComII
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pany ... " (Emphasis added)

c) "The defendant requested that the plaintiff
permit the defendant to receive the plaintiff's
stock to be issued in Standard Gilsonite Company as trustee for the plaintiff. ... " (Emphasis
added)
d) That defendant represented to plaintiff that
because of his knowledge of the market for said
stock that he could arrange sales for the plaintiff
at ''the best possible price.''
e) "That the defendant did not take into his
possession and custody the 37,500 shares of
stock as he had agreed to do ... ''
Even viewing the foregoing in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, these findings will not support
a conclusion that defendant ever acted as a trustee
of plaintiff's 37,500 shares of Standard Gilsonite stock.
According to the Restatement of Trusts, Vol. l,
sec. 75:
"An interest which has not come into existence ...
cannot be held in trust."

The comments on this section make the matter
even clearer.
"a) An interest may not be in existence because the thing which would be the subject matter of the interest is not in existence, or because
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
although the thing is not in existence no one
has an interest in it ... A person can, it is true,
make a contract binding himself to create a trust
of an interest if he should thereafter acquire it;
but such an agreement is not binding as a contract unless the requirements of the law of contracts are complied with. (See comment b).
"Thus, if a person gratuitously declares
himself trustee of such shares as he may thereafter acquire in a corporation not yet organized,
no trust is created. The result is the same where
instead of declaring himself trustee, he purports
to transfer to another as trustee such shares as
he may thereafter acquire in a corporation not
yet organized. In such a case there is at most a
gratuitous undertaking to create a trust in the
future, and such an undertaking is not binding
as a contract for lack of consideration (see cor.nment b). So also, if a person declares himself
trustee of the next picture he will paint or the
next calf his cow will conceive and bear, no
trust is created.
'b) Liability on contract. If a person purports
to declare himself trustee o£ an interest not in
existence, or if he purports to transfer such an
interest to another in trust, he is liable as upon
a contract to create a trust if, but only if, the requirements of the law of contracts are complied
with (See sec. 30).
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Where settlor subsequently acquires an
interest. If a person purports to declare himself
trustee of an interest not in existence or if he purports to transfer such an interest to another in
trust, no trust arises even when the interest
comes into existence in the absence of a manifestation of intention at that time (See sec. 26intention to create a present trust)."
"c)

From the foregoing it should be clear that at
the time of the meeting in Denver on March 15, 1958,
no trust of Standard Gilsonite stock was created, inasmuch as plaintiff owned no stock in Standard Gilsonite Company at that time. The most that such a
transaction could amount to is promise by defendant
to create a trust in the future for the benefit of plaintiff. However, the Findings indicate that no consideration was given defendant for such promise, which
was therefore gratuitous and unenforceable, even
though plaintiff subsequently acquired an interest
in the stock.
Furthermore, the Findings disclose that defendant never took possession o£ plaintiff's shares
(T-16). The uncontroverted testimony at the trial indicated that the shares were never issued by Standard Gilsonite Company until January 19, 1959. Inasmuch as this action was commenced June 16, 1958,
it is not likely, and it was not alleged, that there was
any manifestation of an intention by defendant to
hold any shares in trust for plaintiff after January 19,
1959.
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The only trust shown by the evidence to have
existed was with respect to plaintiff's shares of L. H.
& L. Mining Company for the purpose o£ delivering
the same to Standard Gilsonite Company. It is uncontroverted that the shares were so delivered.
Furthermore, no damages were pleaded or proved
with respect to any alleged breach of this trust.
b) As to whether defendant converted plaintiff's stock in Standard Gilsonite Companny.

The alleged conversion of plaintiff's Standard
Gilsonite stock arose out of two sales of plaintiff's
stock to a Mr. Weatherspoon and his associates.
On April 11, 1958, plaintiff executed Exhibit 22
which purported to transfer 16,000 shares to McGee
Enterprises of Hereford, Texas on a "when issued"
basis. On April 17, 1958, plaintiff executed ExhiJ:it
21, which plaintiff described as a stock power, to
transfer 15,000 shares of stock to McGee and Witherspoon.
Plaintiff testified that each of the sales were actually made for the benefit of the defendant, and that
defendant agreed to replace the stock so transferred
with stock of his own.
There are at least four reasons why these transactions do not amount to conversion by the defendant.
There can be no conversion of property not
yet in existence.
1)
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In Bertleson v. Van Deusen Bros. Co., 37 Idaho
199, 217 Pac. 983, the evidence disclosed that a man
and wife named Berry had agreed to sell plaintiff
the 1917 hay crop to be grown on their land at $8.00
per ton. Plaintiff had tendered part payment. After
the crop was grown and stacked the Berry's repudiated the contract, whereupon plaintiff measured the
crop and tendered the balance, which the Berry's
refused. Thereafter, they sold the crop to the defendant, who had no notice of plaintiff's prior dealing with the Berry's. Plaintiff brought suit against
defendant in claim and delivery. At the trial judgment was awarded plaintiff against defendant, who
appealed.
The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed, holding
that the contract between plaintiff and the Berrys
was executory at the time it was made, and that no
title passed to plaintiff, without which they could not
maintain an action for claim and delivery. The Court
also indicated that the same result would obtain on
a suit for conversion, and stated that the plaintiffs
only remedy was to sue the Berrys for the breach
~
of their contract to deliver the )'lay.
--!..·;.:),.~

In the present case the evidence does not sn61n
the date at which p_laintiff became entitled-toreceive
37,500 shares of stock_ from the Stan_d-ard Gi1sonile
Company. The evidence merely shows that on
March 15, 1958, plaintiff gave his L. H. & L. stoc-k to
defendant for _delivery ~o. the Standard _Gilsonite
Company (T-117); that it was deli~ered to->th-e comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pany sometime later; and that some delay and difficulty was experienced getting the L. H. & L. stock
transferred into the name of Standard Gilsonite Company.
The uncontroverted testimony of the comptroller of Standard Gilsonite Company indicates that
plaintiff's stock was not issued until January 19, 1959,
which was long after the dates of all the transactions
in question (T-157).

2) In order to

pr~ve

a co·nversion of his stock,
plaintiff must show that he had the right to possession of the stock at the time of the alleged conversion.

In Christensen v. Pugh, 84 Utah 440, 36 P.2d
100, the Supreme Court of Utah sustained a demurrer

to plaintiff's complaint, where the complaint showed
that plaintiff's stock with plaintiff's consent was subjected to a bailment which had never been terminated. See also 53 Am. Jur.. Trover and Conversion,
sec. 68 and cases cited therein.
The physical evidence adduced by plaintiff
demonstrates that plaintiff's stock was to be escrowed
(See Exhibit l, T-355). Mr. Williamson, who arranged
the exchange of stock with plaintiff testified that he
(acting for Standard Gilsonite Company) and Lake
had agreed to escrow the plaintiff's stock with Williamson for one year (T-261).
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templated (T-111) but stated that the escrow holder
was to be his attorney or bank (T-112, 172).
Furthermore, as pointed out in the preceding
subdivision, the evidence in this case does not show
that plaintiff was entitled to have the stock issued
to him by Standard Gilsonite Company at any time
prior to January 19, 1959.
3) No action for conversion can be maintained
where the plaintiff consents to the specific acts of defendant of which he complains.
Thus, in Christensen v. Pugh, supra, the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
"In this action plaintiff pleads that he delivered or
caused to be delivered, to defendant Pugh the property in question, to be used by Pugh as collateral
in Pugh's deal and business, for Pugh's benefit, and
not for plaintiff's use, business or benefit. The trans·
fer of possession was a willful and voluntary act
of the plaintiff, and he cannot now assert that Pugh
obtained possession in defiance of his title or his
right of possession, and so maintain an action in
conversion simply because Pugh may have had ulterior motives. It follows, therefore, that plaintiff's
first ground of conversion fails."

In the present case the uncontroverted evidence
discloses that plaintiff knew of the two sales of his
stock and that he not only consented to such sales,
but that he voluntarily executed the documents necesary to complete the sales. In fact the second sale
was completed after plaintiff, who claimed he did
not understand the transaction, had consulted with
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his brother, and after plaintiff was advised by his
brother that it seemed to be "a fair deal". (T-80-81)
Acceptance by the plaintiff o·f the proceeds
of the sale of the property alleged to have been converted operates as a ratification or waiver of the
alleged acts of conversion.
4)

In the case of Dimock v. United States National
Bank, 55 N.J.L. 296, 25 Atl. 926, Dimock and others
had given the United States National Bank (hereinafter referred to as the bank) a note for $50,000, which
was secured by corporate stock. The note authorized the bank to sell the stock before maturity if l)
the market value of the stock depreciated below the
loan balance, and 2) the promisors failed to pay the
difference between the loan balance and the lower
value of the stock after notice to do so. Prior to maturity of the note many. banks failed, and the promisors were forced to make an assignment for the
benefit of their creditors. At that time the market
value of the stock had fallen below the loan balance.
Instead of calling upon the promisors to pay the difference, the bank sent a notice to the promisors demanding payment of the note in full. Thereafter, but
still before maturity of the note, the bank sold the
stock and applied the proceeds to the loan balance.
Several years later, this suit was brought by the bank
to recover the deficiency.
The defendants alleged that the bank had converted their stock by its unauthorized sale of the
stock, and sought to recover the highest value the
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stock had attained between the date of the conversion and the time of the trial.
The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Iersey
held that the bank had converted. the stock by its unauthorized sale; that the correct measure of damages was the so-called "New York Rule," which the
court stated to be the majority rule, and which would
allow as damages the highest intermediate value of
the stock between the time of the conversion and a
reasonable time after the owner received notice of
it.

However, the court also found that the promisors
had notice of the sale immediately after the sale, and
had never objected to the sale; and that on two occasians the promisors had set forth a list of their creditors which contained the name of the bank and
showed as a balance due ·the bank approximately
the difference between the loan balance and the
proceeds of the sale. The court then said:
"The defendants had the election either to ratify the
sale, and claim the benefit of it, or repudiate it, and
hold the plaintiff in damages. The act of the defendants in applying the proceeds of the sale as a
credit on the plaintiff's note is so positive and emphatic an act of ratification and adoption that it
cannot be retracted."

The judgment was thereupon affirmed.
In the case now before the court the evidence
and the Findings of Fact indicate that the plaintiff
received the proceeds of the sales of the stock for
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which recovery is now sought, except for $2,500,
most of which plaintiff admitted he had received
from defendant as loans. (T-170)
Defendant respectfully submits that any one of
the foregoing factors would preclude the court from
finding that defendant had converted plaintiff's
stock. It should also be remembered that the court
found as a fact that defendant never took possession
or custody of plaintiff's 37,500 shares of stock. Accordingly, it would be legally impossible for the
defendant to act as a trustee of plaintiffs' stock, or to
convert the same.
According to the case of Christensen vs. Pugh,
supra, the most frequently quoted definition of conversion is:
"Conversion consists either in the appropriation of
a thing to the party's own use and beneficial enjoyment, or in its destruction, or in exercising dominion over it, in exclusion or defiance of the owner's
right, or in withholding the possession of the property from the owner under a claim of title incon~.istent with his own."

In view of the fact that defendant never took
possession or custody of the stock, and that the plaintiff knew of the sales, consented· to :them, and~ received the proceeds thereof, it cannot('be satd·.that
defendant did any of the acts contain-ed· in ihe above
-definition necessary to prove a .conversion.·
~.
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III
THE TRIAL COURT ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY APPLIED THE MAXIM "FALSUS IN UNOI
FALSUS IN OMNIBUS" TO DISCREDIT DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY.
During the course of the trial, the plaintiff testified that defendant, on three occasions, had adanced him funds totalling $2,500. The plaintiff explained these, and the court found as a fact that they
were part of a larger amount ($15,000) which defendant was to advance plaintiff as organizational
expenses, including living expenses of plaintiff in
connection with the joint venture in the Life Massage
business. Defendant, on the other hand, contended
that these were merely loans to plaintiff which were
ultimately repaid out of the proceeds of the first
stock sale, plaintiff receiving the balance of the
proceeds.
On the backs of Exhibit 25 and 26 (two checks
in the amount of $1,000 each) were legends indicating these were loans. At the trial plaintiff testified
that he could not say whether· the legends were
there when he cashed the checks (T-171). Defendant insisted they were there when the checks were
deposited (T-286). At the conclusion of the case the
trial court stated that it appeared to him that he
legends were written over the bank's cancellation
stamps~ and thusl would not support defendanfs
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wise. The court then applied the maxim that where
"a witness falsifies about one thing you can disbelieve his testimony on others.'' (T-332)
At the time defendant's counsel moved to
amend the Findings of Fact he attempted to present
to the court photostats of the exhibits obtained from
the bank showing that the legends were on the
checks at the time they cleared the bank. However,
the court rejected the offer (T-30), and also refused
to adopt the defendant's proposed findings which
included the court's actual findings with respect to
why it chose to disbelieve defendant's testimony
(See T-23-26).
In 4 Jones on Exedince sec. 2471 (2d Ed.) we find
the reason for the adoption of the maxim ''falsus in
uno, falsus in omnibus.'' After stating that the maxim
originally applied to one who had been convicted
of perjury, the author states, quoting Judge Story:
"Where a party speaks to a fact in respect to which
he cannot be presumed liable to mistake, as in relation to the country of his birth, or his being in a
vessel on a particular voyage, or living in a partie··
ular place, iF lhe fact turn ou;t otherwise, it is extremely difficult to exempt him from the charge
of deliberate falsehood; and courts of justice; under
such circumstances, are bound upon pri11ciples of
law and morality and justice to apply the maxim
falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. ,What .ground of
judicial belief can there be left when·:the party has
shown such gross insensibility to the difference between right and wrong, betwee11:. truth and falsehood?" (Quoting from The Santissima Trinidad, 7
Wheat. (U. S.) 283, 5 L. ed. 454.) ~(ltmphasis added)
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Jones further states, among others, the follow:ing limitations on the application of the maxim.:
_
l) The testimony concerning whic~ th~ wit:_ness has sworn falsely must relate to a material ...
point in issue.
· 2) Such testimony must have been giv~n b;;:o
the witness intentionally, and he must have
known it to be false. {4 Jones on Evidence sec.
2472, 2d Ed.)
We respectfully submit that both limitations militate against the application of the maxim in this case.
Defendant's testimony that the legends were in place
on the checks when given to plaintiff was not controverted by plaintiff. Consequently, this point was
never in issue. In the second place, an examination
of the photostats supplied by defendant's bank
shows defendant's testimony to have been true,
rather than false (See T-30).
We respectfully submit that this adds new meaning to the statement of the trial judge, "while Mr.
Pinder's story of this loan--+and it fits into the $4,000.00-would be quite convincing if it were not
for the fact that I think thQ.t it is not borne out and the
contrary is borne out by the writing on that check."
(T-332) Thus, in his findings from the bench the trial
judge announced, in effect, that he would believe
Pinder's testimony except that the writing on the
checks ap:peareg to b.e added .after the _checks had
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33

cleared the bank. In view of this statement, and in
view of the fact that all the physical evidence introduced corroborates Pinder's version of the "loans"
and the alleged joint venture, we submit that the
weight of the evidence clearly indicates that there
was no joint venture in the Life Massage business,
and that it was error for the court to find otherwise.
CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully submits that the Findings of Fact are not supported by the ev]dence and
are contrary to the evidence in the particulars hereinabove set forth; that the court improperly discredited defendant's testimony; and that in any
event the evidence at the trial will not justify the
Conclusions of Law and the judgment entered
against the defendant on any theory.
WHEREFORE, we respectfully request that this
Honorable Court reverse the judgment heretofore
entered by the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN G. MARSHALL
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant Robert J. Pinder
53 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City 11, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

